To explore the diagnostic thinking process of medical students.
valuating the thought process of clinical diagnosis is difficult because of the methodological difficulty in studying complex cognitive skills including clinical reasoning and judgment. Sackett et al. described 4 types of diagnostic thinking styles Ð pattern recognition, multiplebranching method, method of exhaustion, and hypotheticodeductive method Ð based upon results in cognitive psychology theory. He emphasized the usefulness of the hypothetico-deductive method for clinical diagnosis in the primary care setting. 1 This method is based on Bayes' theorem and naturally lends itself to integration in quantitative decision analysis. 2 The diagnostic behavior of seasoned physicians seems to fit the hypothetico-deductive method. Experienced physicians usually focus their attention quite narrowly to provide only a few specific diagnostic hypotheses. They then evaluate new clinical data in the light of these hypotheses, adjust for the likelihood of each hypothesis, reject some as implausible, and introduce a new hypothesis. This process of sequential revision is interrupted when the likelihood of one diagnosis becomes high enough to warrant action (i.e., a special test or an urgent therapy) or low enough to abandon further consideration of the disease. Little is known, however, regarding how to evaluate a physician's diagnostic thinking process and how to improve a novice physician's diagnostic expertise efficiently. Quite often we encounter cases in which medical students or novice residents have difficulty in differentiating diagnosis and repeat inadequate laboratory or imaging tests. Accordingly, we planned this study to clarify the following: 1) how closely medical students follow the hypothetico-deductive method in diagnostic thinking process; and 2) the nature of the problems they face in their diagnostic process. We analyzed their diagnostic abilities in terms of 3 elements of the hypothetico-deductive method, knowledge of test characteristics (sensitivity and specificity), ability to estimate pre-test disease probability from clinical history, and ability to estimate post-test probability from pre-test probability and test characteristics.
METHODS

Target Population and Data Collection
We surveyed fifth-year medical students between September 1999 and May 2000 at 3 medical schools in Japan. The total number of years in medical school in Japan is universally 6. The curricula generally consist of 1 to 2 years of liberal arts education, 1 to 2 years of basic medical science courses, and 2 to 3 years of clinical science courses and clinical rotations. The curricula of the these medial schools are similar and include 2 or 3 sessions of primer courses on clinical epidemiology that cover basic principles of epidemiology, design of clinical trials, and the concepts of frequency, risk, and probability. The curricula also include an introduction to Bayes' theorem and the use of the probabilistic perspective in clinical diagnosis.
Subject students were surveyed before starting clinical rotation (medical school B and C) or within 2 weeks after starting rotation (medical school A), so that the medical students had no actual experience of clinical work at the time of this study. The students had completed at least 1 session of Bayes' theorem.
We presented hypothetical scenarios of chest pain patients to the students and asked them to answer questions. Each student was asked to provide answers independently to the best of his or her ability, based on the scenarios along with their own knowledge and experience. Clinical scenarios of typical anginal pain, atypical anginal pain, and non-anginal chest pain were provided. The corresponding pre-test probabilities of coronary artery disease were calculated as 90%, 46%, and 5%, respectively, from the data of Diamond et al. (Table 1) . 3, 4 The questionnaire consisted of 3 sections: 1) test characteristics questions, 2) pre-test and post-test probability questions, and 3) decision questions ( Table 2 ). The test characteristics questions were asked before presenting the clinical scenarios. Then, the pre-test and post-test probability questions were posed for each scenario, followed by the decision questions regarding typical anginal chest pain with a negative exercise stress test (EST) result (Case scenario 1), or atypical chest pain with a positive EST result (Case scenario 3). Students were expected to provide a dichotomized answer for closedended questions and to provide a single numerical value for open-ended questions.
Data Analysis
We defined 3 parameters (3 probability estimates) to evaluate the students' clinical diagnostic ability (Appendix A). 1) Intuitive estimates were defined as sensitivity, specificity, and pre-test probability estimates provided by the students (Se INT A 45-year-old man without past medical history and coronary risk factors presented with 3-week history of stabbing chest pain in the retrosternal area. The patient reported that the pain was usually stabbing-like but sometimes pressure-like and developed during both rest and exercise. On physical examination, there is vague tenderness on costochondral joints. Case scenario 3 (non-anginal chest pain, reference estimate of pre-test probability is 5%)
A 30-year-old man without a significant medical problem and coronary risk factors presented with 6-week history of squeezing pain in the lower retrosternal area to upper abdomen. The pain develops after meals, especially when he is lying down after late dinner. ) reflects the ability to estimate post-test probability from pre-test probability and the test characteristics. Thus, the smaller the differences are, the higher ability the student has.
To calculate the contribution of post-test probability to the students' decision to start therapy, we used logisticregression analysis. 5 The dichotomized answer to the question whether to start medical therapy for angina pectoris (i.e., starting or not starting a medical therapy) was regressed to post-test probability estimated by students (PPV INT or NPV INT ). In this model, a positive b coefficient means that there is a positive association between post-test probability and the action of starting a therapy.
To test the hypothesis that there is no difference in students' estimates distribution among 3 medical schools, we used the Kruskal-Wallis test. Summary measures of probability estimates were expressed as means SEM. Statistical significance of difference in probability estimates was checked by Student's t test. Statistical analysis was performed using STATA statistical software (Intercooled Stata for Windows95/98/NT, edition 6.0; Stata Corp., College Station, Tex).
RESULTS
Two hundred twenty-four medical students answered the questionnaire. Demographic information on the subject students in 3 medical schools is presented in Table 3 . The characteristics of the students in 3 medical schools were similar, but confidence in their understanding of Bayesian diagnostic thinking was substantially different among schools. Although a significant difference in means of students' estimates among schools was observed for some questions, the difference was not systematic and not associated with a particular school. Therefore, the results for all 3 schools were aggregated.
The difference between reference and intuitive estimates of sensitivity for EST (Se INT À Se REF ) was À2.8% 1.5% (P < .05), and that between reference and intuitive estimates of specificity (Sp INT À Sp REF ) was À21.1% 2.0% (P < .01). Thus, the associated error in estimating specificity was larger than that in estimating sensitivity.
The relationships among reference, intuitive, and Bayesian estimates for each scenario are schematized in the Figures.
For typical angina (Case 1, Fig. 1 ), the intuitive estimate of pre-test probability was much lower than the reference estimate (preProb INT vs NPV BAY = 58.6% 1.6%, difference = À11.9% 2.1% [P < .01]); consequently, the usefulness of EST was overestimated. This overestimation of the EST effect was more conspicuous when the test result was negative, resulting in underestimated NPV INT . In the setting of typical angina with a positive EST result, the associated error between the intuitive estimate and the reference estimate was relatively small. This finding indicates that students can rule in the diagnosis when a patient presents typical symptoms of effort angina in conjunction with positive test results.
For atypical chest pain (Case 2, Fig. 2 ), the intuitive estimate of pre-test probability was almost appropriate (preProb INT = 47.1% 1.6% vs preProb REF = 46%, difference = 1.1% 1.6% [P = .51]). However, the intuitive estimates of Finally, for non-anginal chest pain (Case 3, Fig. 3 ), the intuitive estimates of the pre-test probability and post-test probability showed gross deviations toward overestimating from the reference estimates (preProb INT Estimates and errors in Case Scenario 1 (typical anginal pain). The first column represents reference estimates of pre-test probability, PPV, and NPV. The second column represents intuitive estimates of pre-test probability, PPV, and NPV. The third column represents intuitive estimate of pre-test probability and Bayesian estimates of post-test probability. Makers ., +, ± represent pre-test probability, positive predictive value (PPV), and negative predictive value (NPV), respectively. The estimate of probabilities is displayed as a percentage. The difference between pre-test probability and PPV/NPV (PPV À preProb or NPV À preProb) represents a change of disease likelihood provided by test result. The difference between the intuitive and reference estimates of pre-test probability (preProb INT À preProb REF ) is associated with the ability to estimate the pre-test probability of the disease from the available clinical history. The difference between the intuitive and reference estimates of post-test probability (PPV INT 
is associated with overall diagnostic ability. The difference between the intuitive and Bayesian estimates of post-test probability (PPV INT À PPV BAY , NPV INT À NPV BAY ) is associated with the ability to estimate post-test probability from pre-test probability and the test characteristics. The closer to 0 the error is, the higher the ability is.
estimates of post-test probability were more exaggerated than the Bayesian estimates (PPV INT = 59.0% 1.5% vs PPV BAY = 51.5% 1.9%, difference = À7.4% 1.6% [P < .01]; NPV INT = 26.8% 1.5% vs NPV BAY = 30.5% 1.7%, difference = 3.8% 1.8% [P < .05]); and the usefulness of EST was overestimated. The overestimation was larger when the EST was positive (PPV BAY À preProb INT ). This observation indicates that students were easily confused by test results that differed from their anticipated results.
For decision questions, 117 students (52.2%) answered that the patient with typical anginal pain should be treated in spite of a negative EST result, 101 students (45.1%) provided the opposite answer, and 6 students (2.7%) did not respond. One hundred forty-four students (64.3%) recommended no therapeutic action for the patient with atypical chest pain and a positive EST, 69 students (30.8%) answered the opposite, and 11 students (4.9%) provided no answer. The b-coefficient of the logistic regression model was 0.02 (P < .01) for decision question 1 and 0.05 (P < .01) for decision question 2. Thus, in both situations, the association between the post-test probability and the decision to start therapy is positive, which means that the higher the post-test probability a student estimates, the more likely he/she is to consider starting therapy.
DISCUSSION
The formal diagnostic thinking process in clinical epidemiology is divided into 3 stages: 1) hypothesis generation of possible diagnoses; 2) estimation of pre-test probability; and 3) interpretation of test results, i.e., revision of pre-test probability by test results to obtain post-test probability. When the post-test probability of a diagnostic hypothesis exceeds the action threshold for a specific treatment, a physician starts the treatment (rule in). When negative test results decrease the post-test probability low enough to refute the hypothesis, the physician stops further examination or therapeutic action (rule out) and starts to assess the next diagnostic hypothesis. 6 In an earlier study, Lyman and Balducci 7 assessed the effect of test results on the estimation of disease likelihood using hypothetical scenarios involving a common clinical situation. Hypothetical patients with a breast lump were presented to physicians and nonphysicians, and estimates of the pre-test and post-test probability of breast cancer and mammography sensitivity and specificity were elicited. The subjects consistently overestimated the disease likelihood associated with a positive test result compared to the probabilities derived from Bayes' theorem based on the subjects' estimates of pre-test probabilities and the test characteristics, in contrast to that associated with negative test results.
The most remarkable findings in our study were as follows: medical students could not rule out disease efficiently in low or intermediate pre-test disease likelihood settings; and they were easily confused by test results that differed from those anticipated. The former flaw was mainly due to poor estimations of pre-test probability of the disease. Students failed to lower the pre-test probability on the basis of the information derived from the clinical scenario. The latter flaw indicates that medical students are not proficient in applying Bayes' theorem to real clinical situations. These diagnostic thinking patterns account for medical students or novice physicians sometimes repeating inadequate or unnecessary examinations.
Some explanations can be given for students' inaccuracy in estimating pre-test probabilities of disease on the basis of clinical information. First, psychological research has found that in a variety scientific problemsolving situations, people have a preference for confirming strategies over disconfirming strategies, although logically, disconfirmation is more conclusive and potentially efficient. 8, 9 Confirming strategy refers to the search for or the use of evidence to prove a hypothesis, whereas disconfirming strategy refers to the search for or the use of evidence to rule out or reduce the probability of a given hypothesis. The confirming strategy approach supports à`r ule in'' rather than a``rule out'' thinking process. It has also been found that the number of hypotheses that are generated affects the use of confirmation or disconfirmation strategies. When subjects were instructed to consider a single hypothesis, they showed a preference for à`c onfirming'' strategy, but when instructed to consider several hypotheses, they tended to use a``disconfirming'' strategy. 10 Because students were presented a single diagnostic hypothesis (i.e., coronary artery disease) and requested to estimate the probability of the hypothesis, they might have preferred gathering information for confirming or ruling in to disconfirming or ruling out the diagnostic hypothesis. Second, it has been pointed out that physicians often fail to understand the importance of negative information. 11 This tendency may be related to the traditional medical education, i.e., focusing on acquiring basic science/medical knowledge in the framework of a biomedical model. In fact, teachers or textbooks often emphasize information on abnormal findings, not the significance of normal findings. Ruling out disease is also less emphasized than the importance of not overlooking a possible disease.
The most important criticism of this study is the assumption of students' Bayesian probabilistic thinking process. Although we modeled the students' diagnostic thinking process according to the Bayesian perspective, the Bayesian thinking process is not a native thinking process but is acquired only by education, and students may not think consistently in the Bayesian perspective. 12 To verify whether the students' diagnostic thinking process was independent from the Bayesian perspective, we analyzed the association between the post-test probability estimated by the student and his/her decision to take a therapeutic action. The result (i.e., the higher the post-test probability, the more likely the student was to initiate therapy) suggests that medical students, at least in part, think in accordance with the Bayesian perspective. The fact that subject students had little clinical experience is another limitation of this study. It might hamper generalization of the results of this study to medical learners in more advanced stages.
One of the most important tasks in primary care is ruling out the possibilities of serious diseases on the basis of history and physical examination. In this study, medical students could not rule out disease in low or intermediate pre-test probability settings, mainly because of poor pretest estimates of disease probability. They were also easily confused by test results that were not in agreement with those anticipated, probably because of their inaptitude in applying Bayes' theorem to real clinical situations. It is clear that the students' diagnostic thinking process presented here cannot deal optimally with these needs.
In conclusion, medical students' diagnostic abilities are likely to be enhanced by: 1) emphasizing the importance of ruling out disease in clinical practice; 2) training to estimate pre-test probability of disease on the basis of history and physical examination; and 3) incorporating the Bayesian probabilistic perspective and the application of the theory to real clinical situations.
